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ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
COVE VIEW EXCAVATING 
AND CONSTRUCTION CO., 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
D. THOMAS FLYNN and D. 
THOMAS FLYNN CONSTRUCTION, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to 
the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(c). 
The Defendants appeal a judgment rendered by the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Sevier County, State of Utah, the Honorable Don V. 
Tibbs, acting Circuit Court Judge, sitting without a jury. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial Court's findings are clearly 
erroneous and should be set aside. 
2. Whether, as a matter of law, the Plaintiff's 
negotiation of an instrument with a restrictive endorsement 
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constitutes an accord and satisfaction. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1984 the Utah Department of Transportation let a 
construction project for the improvement of a bridge on a 
public road in Sevier County. Defendants were the successful 
bidder for the project. During the course of construction, 
Defendants employed Plaintiff to furnish backhoe and pump 
services. Plaintiff did so at the agreed rate of $125.00 per 
hour for backhoe services, and $35.00 per day for pump 
services. The backhoe and pump services were necessitated 
because of unexpected excess water that season, a situation 
which Defendants could not meet because of the absence of 
similiar equipment. 
Plaintiff furnished 41.5 hours of backhoe services to 
Defendants on May 7 through May 15, 1984, and furnished the 
pump for the use by Defendants through June 14, 1984. 
Plaintiff billed Defendants on May 25, 1984, as was its custom, 
and billed Defendants again at the end of June, 1984. 
Plaintiff's May billing to Defendants totalled $5,922.50. 
After receiving Plaintiff's first billing, but before receiving 
his second billing, Defendants tendered a check to Plaintiff 
for $5,000.00, the check having written thereon a restrictive 
endorsement that read "payment in full for all labor and 
materials through June 26, 1984.ff Upon receiving the $5,000.00 
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check, Plaintiff sought the advice of counsel, and thereafter 
cashed the check. Defendants did not respond to Plaintiff!s 
second billing, and this suit resulted. 
At trial Defendants claimed that Plaintiff did not 
furnish 41.5 hours of backhoe services, and that the pump was 
not in fact used through June 14, 1984. The Court specifically 
found in favor of Plaintiff on those two points. The Court 
also found that there was no dispute between the parties at or 
before the time that Plaintiff received the $5,000.00 check, 
and that the transaction between the parties was in the nature 
of an ongoing account. The Court observed that there was no 
meeting of the minds to effect an accord and satisfaction and 
viewed the restrictive endorsement as having no import. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff presented substantial evidence to support 
its claim. Defendants presented conflicting evidence which the 
Court chose not to believe. No error exists where the trier of 
fact reaches its conclusions and findings upon conflicting 
evidence if there is some substantial evidence to support those 
findings. 
Department of Transportation records were properly 
authenticated and received into evidence. The inability of the 
project inspector to recall some aspects of the construction 
project did not render those records inadmissable. His 
- 4 -
imperfect memory would go only to the weight of his testimony. 
Plaintiff's retention and negotiation of a check 
containing a restrictive endorsement did not constitute an 
accord and satisfaction because: 
(a) No dispute existed between the parties at 
the time. 
(b) The situation presented an ongoing account. 
(c) Ther was no meeting of the minds so as to 
effect a compromise. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WAS RECEIVED 
TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT 
Defendants attack the findings of the Court contending 
that they are clearly erroneous. The problem with that 
approach is simply that they wanted the trier of fact to 
believe their testimony and discount that of Plaintiff whereas 
the Court did the opposite. Plaintiff presented competent and 
substantial evidence to support its claim which the Court chose 
to believe. Specifically, Defendants cite the following 
findings in arguing that the Court was in error: 
(a) That Plaintiff furnished 41.5 hours of 
backhoe services to Defendants. 
(b) That no dispute regarding hours bLlled to 
Defendants existed when Defendants delivered a $5,000.00 check 
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to Plaintiff containing a restrictive endorsement. 
(c) That the $5,000.00 check represented a 
progress payment. 
However, each of the foregoing finds ample support in 
the evidence. Mr. Grundy, Plaintiff's president and the 
backhoe operator, testified to the following: 
(a) That the agreed hourly rate for the backhoe 
was $125.00 (T.9). 
(b) That excess water problems necessitated use 
of the backhoe for a number of days more than was anticipated 
by Defendants (T.9,10). 
(c) The excess water also indicated use of a 
larger pump than Defendants owned and they rented such from 
Plaintiff at the rate of $35.00 per day (T.ll). 
(d) Plaintiff customarily bills the last weekend 
of each month and consistent with that policy billed Defendants 
on May 25, midway through the project (T.ll). 
(e) 41.5 hours of backhoe work was performed 
(Exhibit #13), (T.12). 
(f) Defendants continued to use Plaintiff's pump 
after the May 25 billing (T.12). 
(g) The pump was used through June 14. (T.13). 
(h) Plaintiff's final billing to Defendants was 
sent June 27 (Exhibit #14), (T.14). 
(i) Plaintiff received the $5,000.00 check on 
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June 30 which was after sending the second billing (T.16). 
(j) No dispute arose before the $5,000.00 check 
was received by Plaintiff (T.30,31,33,34). 
(k) When Plaintiff received the $5,000.00 it was 
considered as simply payment on account but also as an improper 
effort by Defendants to avoid full payment (T.36,16). 
The construction inspector for the Utah Department of 
Transportation testified that he supervised and inspected the 
job in question on a daily basis (T.40), that high water, 
created the need for greater excavating (T.41,42), and that 
Defendants had insufficient equipment (T.43). He confirmed the 
hourly rates for the backhoe and pump (T.44), and identified 
construction records which corroborated the testimony of Mr. 
Grundy (T.49, 50). 
Mr. FlynnTs testimony was at odds with Plaintiff's 
evidence but his credibility became questionable when he 
claimed that the Department of Transportation records were 
false (T.85,86,89). The picture becomes clearly focused when 
he admits that the high water problems caused a one month time 
delay in completing the project (T.92). 
When the trial Court is called upon to resolve issues 
of fact based upon evidence which is in conflict, and makes 
findings as to those facts which he finds to be convincing, 
then those findings will not be disturbed on appeal as long as 
there is some substantial evidence to support them. Bountiful 
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v. Swift, Utah, 535 P.2d 1236 (1975); McCarren v. Merrill, 
Utah, 389 P.2d 732, (1964); Perry v, Farr, Utah, 645 P.2d 649 
(1982); Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., Utah, 657 
P.2d 743 (1982). 
Defendants next claim that the Department of 
Transportation records were improperly admitted, but confuse 
their argument by questioning the competency of the state 
inspector to testify (page 7, Brief of Appellant). 
As to the admissibility of the records (exhibit #15), 
the evidence confirmed that they were part of the Department of 
Transportation project file and that Mr. Munroe, as project 
inspector was the author of them (T.47,48,49). The documents 
were also accompanied by a certification of an official 
custodian. Clearly they were properly received under the 
public records exception to the hearsay rule. Rule 803 (8), 
Utah Rules of Evidence. 
POINT II 
THE COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE LAW TO THE CASE 
Defendants' final argument is that the Court failed to 
follow the law as expressed in the case of Marton Remodeling v. 
Jensen, Utah, 706 P.2d 607 (1985). If the facts of the case 
were as Defendants want them to be, then Marton Remodeling 
would possibly have application. However, the facts as found 
by the Court were at odds with the theory of Defendants. 
Marton Remodeling simply states the general common law rule 
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that where there exists a single unliquidated claim following 
completion of the job or project in question, or a bona fide 
dispute over the total amount due, then the parties to the 
transaction may resolve their differences by the making of a 
compromise offer by the debtor and the acceptance of that offer 
by the creditor. Defendants claim that Marton Remodeling is 
applicable to the instant matter because there existed a 
dispute concerning the total amount due, and that there existed 
a single and unified claim.. However, the Court found to the 
contrary on those two points. The ruling of the Court 
specifically states that no dispute existed between the parties 
at the time that Defendants tendered the $5,000.00 check, and 
that the transaction between them was an ongoing account. In 
that regard, the Court stated: 
The Court makes a specific finding that --
the Court finds that there was no accord and 
satisfaction in this matter, that accord and 
satisfaction is based on the meeting of the 
minds of the parties that they have agreed 
that that will be in settlement of the 
claim. The Court finds under the 
circumstance of this case, no accord and 
satisfaction was ever reached. The Court 
finds that just sending a check marked "Paid 
in fullM, without there even being an 
indicated dispute by either party, is not 
fair, not proper, and the Court finds that 
this was an ongoing account, and the pump 
was on the premises, and being used for the 
-- at the time, and the Court finds that 
there's no accord and satisfaction. And the 
restrictive endorsement had no effect, and 
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the Court finds it unfair even sending it, a 
check like that in payment of services. The 
Court finds that the records of the State 
Department of Transportation indicate that 
there was the equipment on the job, being 
used. The Court finds that the parties 
agreed to pay, or the Defedant agreed to pay 
$125.00 an hour and the hour rate is billed 
by the Plaintiff, and as, which appears to 
the Court by this DOT records, that the 
equipment was used on the premises for that 
period of time. T. 118, 119. 
Paragraph number seven of the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment is also instructive. It reads, 
in part, as follows: 
However, Plaintiff did not intend said 
account to be satisfied upon receipt of 
$5,000.00, consulted counsel with reference 
thereto, and negotiated said check without 
intending same to satisfy the account, and 
accordingly, no accord and satisfaction 
occurred between the parties with reference 
to said check. 
In making the foregoing observations, the Court 
undoubtedly had in mind the specific sequence of events which 
occurred between the parties. Plaintiff sent its intitial 
billing to Defendants on May 25, 1984, and that billing 
reflected equipment services through that date. When 
Defendants sent their $5,000.00 check to Plaintiff, they did 
not have Plaintiff's second billing which requested payment for 
equipment services through June 14, 1984. The $5,000.00 check 
was sent to Plaintiff on June 26, 1984, and Plaintiff's second 
billing to Defendants was sent on June 27, 1984. It is likely 
those two items crossed one another in the mail. Defendants 
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had use of Plaintiff1s large pump at least through June 14, 
1984, and thus, when the $5,000.00 check was sent to Plaintiff, 
it was done so with clear knowledge on the part of Defendants 
that the first billing did not represent charges for the entire 
project. That is the very type of ongoing account, or progress 
payment situation, that the Court found to exist, and the type 
which removes the situation from application of an accord and 
satisfaction under circumstances similiar to those in Martin 
Remodeling. 
The situation in the instant case is very much like 
that of Allen-Howe Specialties v. U.S. Const., Inc., Utah, 611 
P.2d 705 (1980). In Allen-Howe, the Court stated, at page 710: 
An accord and satisfaction is a method of 
discharging a contract. The payment of a 
part of a debt (in situations such as the 
one at hand), does not discharge it, even 
though the debtor exacts a promise that it 
will do so. The debtor, by making part 
payment is doing nothing more than he is 
legally obligated to do; and, therefore, he 
gives the creditor no consideration for the 
promise that part payment will be accepted 
to discharge the entire debt. 
The restrictive endorsement on the back of the 
$5,000.00 check reads "payment in full for all labor and 
materials to 6-26-84." As mentioned, Defendants did not have 
Plaintiff's billing for services between May 25, 1984 and June 
14, 1984 when that endorsement was placed on the check, 
although Defendants were well aware that they had had the use 
of Plaintiff's pump during that period of time. In any event, 
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such an endorsement, will not, as a matter of law, trigger an 
accord and satisfaction. In Hintze v. Seaich, Utah, 437 P.2d 
202 (1968), the Supreme Court of Utah had occasion to construe 
a restrictive endorsement which accompanied a check containing 
language that Mthis is the balance of your account in fullM. 
The holding in Hintze was similiar to the holding of the trial 
Court in the instant matter. At page 208 of the Hintze 
opinion, we find the following: 
In the claim of Mr. Williams, it is clear 
that there was no meeting of the minds that 
the acceptance of the check was to be in 
complete settlement of the dispute. The 
voucher attached to the check did not state 
that the money was to be returned if it was 
not so accepted. We think the trial Court 
was correct in holding that there was not an 
accord and satisfaction in connection with 
Mr. Williams. 
The Court in Hintze also relied upon the general 
statement of the law as found in 1 AmJur2d, Accord and 
Satisfaction, Section 15, wherein it states: 
The mere fact that the creditor receives a 
check or other remittance from his debtor 
for less than the amount which the creditor 
claims, with knowledge that the debtor 
claims to be indebted to him only in the 
amount paid, does not result in an accord 
and satisfaction. 
The trial Court was correct in its ruling. There was 
no dispute between the parties when Plaintiff received the 
$5,000.00 check, nor could there have been, since Defendants 
did not even know the total hours of equipment use which 
Plaintiff was claiming at that time because Defendants had not 
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received Plaintiff's final billing. Without a dispute, and 
with an ongoing account, the type of accord and satisfaction 
which Defendants desire could not have occurred. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial Court should be affirmed 
with costs on appeal to Respondent. 
DATED this 9th day of October, 1987. 
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